One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. John Barnden School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK I assume that [phenomenal] consciousness is a property physical processes can have, and that it involves pre-reflective auto-sensitivity (PRAS), which is related to the much-discussed pre-reflective self-consciousness [3,4]. I then argue that PRAS requires conscious processes to be directly and causally sensitive to their own inner causation as such, and not merely to their own trajectories of physical states as ordinarily understood. That causal sensitivity is therefore metacausation. Metacausation here is where instances of causation are themselves, directly and in their own right, causes or effects. Metacausation (aka higher-order causation) is rarely discussed at all, and has apparently not previously been linked to consciousness. But the proposal is yet more radical as I merely use "causation" to mean microphysical dynamism. I assume (anti-Humeanly) that the universe's law-governed unfolding is a dynamism irreducible to sheer regular patterning over spacetime of familiar physical quantities (masses, charges, fields, curvatures, etc.). Furthermore, I strongly reify dynamism: spatiotemporally specific instances of it are a ``new'' realm of fundamental physical quantities, themselves dynamically interacting in their own right with other quantities (familiar or new). That dynamic interaction is a new level of dynamism, namely metadynamism, with its own laws explicitly mentioning dynamism instances. As causation is just dynamism, metacausation is metadynamism. The poster summarizes the arguments (revising earlier versions [1,2]) and sketches initial formalization steps for metadynamism. It also indicates how metadynamism might be co-opted to enrich other consciousness theories, notably IIT and Orch-OR. References: [1] Barnden, J.A. (2014). Running into consciousness. J. Consciousness Studies, 21 (5-6), pp.33-56. [2] Barnden, J.A. (2018). Phenomenal consciousness, meta-causation and developments concerning casual powers and time passage. Poster presented at 22nd Conference for the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 26-29 June 2018, Krakow. [3] Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2015). Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). [4] Sebastian, M.A. (2012). Experiential awareness: Do you prefer ``it'' to ``me''? Philosophical Topics, 40(2), pp.155-177." Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Models of Consciousness

John Barnden - Consciousness, metacausation and metadynamism

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Pedro Mediano Department of Computing, Imperial College London In a seminal series of papers, Tononi, Sporns, and Edelman (TSE) introduced the idea that the neural dynamics underlying conscious states are characterised by a balance of integration and differentiation between system components. This idea remains prevalent in consciousness research today, influencing theoretical and experimental work. Such work has faced a number of challenges. For example, distinct measures designed to measure such a balance behave very differently in practice, making it hard to choose which is the "right one", and dynamics of conscious and unconscious brains defy some of the predictions of this framework. We argue that these problems arise, at least in part, from the non-specific nature of the concepts of integration and differentiation. Here, we present a revised mathematical theory of neural complexity: we introduce a new measure, called O-information, that quantifies the balance between redundancy and synergy within a system, and is more effective than TSE’s original measure at describing phenomena where large-scale correlation and short-scale independence coexist; and develop a formalism to decompose different "modes" of information dynamics, providing an exhaustive taxonomy of redundant and synergistic effects. These developments allow us to place previous measures within a common framework and explain their their similarities and differences. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Pedro Mediano - Moving beyond integration and differentiation in measures of neural dynamics

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Inês Hipólito University of Wollongong Building on the modular architecture of mind (Fodor 1983), Modularity Networks is claimed as a theory well equipped to explain neural connectivity and reuse (Stanley et al.; 2019, Zerrili 2019). This paper takes the case of the oculomotor system to show that even if Modularity Network’s tools are useful to describe brain’s functional connectivity, they are limited in explaining why such connections are formed and dynamic. To show this, section 1 starts by laying down the reasons for adopting Modularity Networks as well suited for explaining neural connectivity. Section 2 introduces the oculomotor system as a dynamic integration of action and vision. Section 3 argues that however valuable in describing the functional connectivity of the oculomotor system, Modularity Networks fails to explain why such connections are formed and dynamic (dependent on activity). This failure is made evident by acknowledging a fundamental distinction in the metaphysics of inference. The nature of inference is taken differently in functional connectivity as a description of inference as opposed to effective connectivity as an explanation of inference (Friston 2011). Section 4 introduces Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) as a better resource to capture effective connectivity. It allows explaining how and why brain connections, as generative models of cognitive integration, are dependent on the dynamic activity within the environment. This conclusion speaks against modular arguments for encapsulation, innateness and specificity of cognitive organisation. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Inês Hipólito - Generative models of the mind: neural connections and cognitive integration

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Gustav Bernroider University of Salzburg, Dept. of Biosciences, Austria Are there knowable criteria for subjective entities such as conscious experience? I think there are, even physical ones. I advocate the view that the basic dualism between subject and object or mind and matter can be figured by an intuitively simple version of an inside out or inversion relation between two opposing physical domains. I propose a particular topology for subject-object relations and argue that we can find a physical realisation in the brain of living organism that provides a conformal transformation between both domains. The transformation combines two physical domains related by inversion or parity symmetry or simply by mirror reflections. This view puts topological aspects behind inversion and the associated hidden symmetries in physics into the foreground. I introduce the model along three steps: i) evidence and motivation for the role of mirror symmetries from psychobiology based on previous studies (Senso- motory invariance in animal feelings [Bernroider G, Panksepp J. (2011), Neurosci & Biobehav. Rev., 35, 2009-2016.] and mirror-writing in (my grand-) children), ii) an intuitive diagrammatic demonstrating subject-object together with cause and effect relations mapped onto an inversive plane geometry and iii) a more formal outline and extension into the algebraic topology of non- orientable surfaces, the real and complex projective plane. The concept suggested here offers several testable predictions for the relation of ionic brain function to inversion symmetries realised by the molecular architecture of excitable membranes. For example, this aspect seems to be evidenced by enantio-selective electronic transitions during ion conduction in the brain [Bernroider G. (2017) JIN 16, 105-113]. Going beyond these technical aspects, the present view on modelling subjectivity shifts the role of canonical coordinates together with their static dimensional geometry into the background. It favours ideas behind general covariance. A parity transformation, if purely defined at the level of Cartesian coordinates with changing signs, is discrete, the transient itself only inferential, non-physical, with no known conserved quantity associated with this transformation in the sense of Emmy Noether’s theorem. However, if the same transformation is laid out continuously on the geometry of non-orientable surfaces (e.g. on a Möbius band), the transients gain some physics and offer a conserved quantity. I will discuss this conserved quantity with respect to subjectivity and consciousness. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Gustav Bernroider - Neural sense relations and consciousness: a diagrammatic approach

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Marc Ebner Universität Greifswald, Germany The seemingly hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why subjective conscious experience exist. However, Qualia is nothing mysterious. Our subjective conscious experience is comparable across individuals because we are a product of evolution. It is grounded in reality and we use it to communicate with each other. Consciousness seems to be intertwined with language. Its primary role is to serve communication between individuals. We need Qualia to communicate with others. We perceive objects within our visual field relative to the orientation of our head. This information is then stored and can also be communicated to others either during perception or at a later time. The same holds for the perception of sounds or smells. According to the theory proposed here, an assembly of neurons in the brain is in charge of consciousness. The job of this assembly is simply (a) to look at what the body does, (b) to keep a record of it, and (c) to explain it to our peers. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Marc Ebner - A communication-based model of consciousness

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Diana Stanciu University of Bucharest; Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities (BBAW) I will argue that epistemic structural realism (ESR) can offer a feasible theoretical framework for the study of consciousness and its associated neurophysiological phenomena. While structural realism has already been employed in physics or biology (cf. Tegmark 2007, Leng 2010, Ainsworth 2010, 2011, McArthur 2011, Pincock 2011, Woodin 2011, Landry and Rickels 2012, Bain 2013, Andreas and Zenker 2014, Schurz 2014), its application to the study of consciousness is new indeed. Out of its two variants: ontic structural realism (OSR) and ESR, I consider the latter more suitable when studying the neurophysiological bases of consciousness since the OSR drastically claims that ‘there are’ actually no ‘objects’ and that ‘structure’ is all ‘there is’, while the ESR more moderately states that all we can ‘know’ is the ‘structure of the relations between objects’ and not the objects themselves (cf. Van Fraassen 2006). Thus, while not denying the existence of ‘objects’ (even if they are hard to pinpoint when discussing the neurophysiological bases of consciousness), the ESR still emphasises ‘relations’ vs. ‘objects’ and the retention of structure across theory change. In other words, it emphasies the continuity across theory change through the structural or mathematical aspects of our theories (cf. Stanford 2006). Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Diana Stanciu - An ESR model of consciousness

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Aïda Elamrani Institut Jean Nicod, ENS The young field of consciousness science involves highly interdisciplinary research. For this reason, it is producing heterogeneous results which are hard to compare. This emerging discipline could benefit from a unifying, theory- neutral framework for analytical purposes. To this end, we must firstly identify a common ground between concurrent models. A brief scan through history reveals that consciousness has consistently revolved around the mind vs matter dichotomy. This binary split can be argued to span a sufficiently broad and flexible domain to semantically hold any contemporary scientific formulation of the consciousness problem, since most of them strive to provide a physical account of subjective experience. Accordingly, our reverse- engineered general frame is expected to map elements from mind-space to elements from matter-space, accepting a simple functional notation: Consciousness (INPUT) = OUTPUT. Although this equation might evoke Hilary Putnam’s functionalism, essential differences with the meta-model are emphasized by introducing its relation to Shannon’s information. Finally, alternative implementations and applications of this representation are used to illustrate and compare current accounts of consciousness. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Aïda Elamrani - Inputs, outputs, and meta-models

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Chetan Prakash California State University, San Bernardino A scientific understanding of the process whereby physical entities produce consciousness has not come about, despite decades of investigation. This suggests exploring the reversal of the celebrated “hard problem of consciousness,” i.e., take consciousness as fundamental and the physical world as emergent. We describe D. Hoffman’s Interface Theory of Perception in which perceptual experiences do not approximate properties of an “objective” world, but reside in simplified, species-specific, user interfaces. Building on this, the Conscious Realism Thesis states that the objective world consists entirely of a social network of ‘conscious agents’ and their experiences, which together create the objects and properties of our common physical world. Using evolutionary game theory, we justify interface theory by showing that perceptual strategies reporting the truth will be driven to extinction by those tuned instead to fitness. We state further theorems on fitness beating truth, by showing that perceived structures, such as symmetries, partial orders and probabilities, will likely not be possessed by a world. We define “conscious agents,” suggesting that space-time is a property of the perceptual interface of human conscious agents: physical “objects” are akin to icons on that interface; physical “phenomena” are properties of apparently interacting icons. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Chetan Prakash - Structure Invention by Conscious Agents

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Quanlong Wang Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford Natural science has a basic assumption that there exists a kind of objectivity in the world independent of any consciousness. But how could one verify such objectivity given the fact that human beings can only perceive any existence through their own consciousness? On the other hand, there is a possibility for the existence of pure consciousness which could support the appearance of all phenomena, as claimed by the Yogācāra school of Indian philosophy. Based on this philosophy, any consciousness consists of two divisions: the perceived division (nimittabhaga in Sanskrit) and the perceiving division (darsanabhaga in Sanskrit). The perceiving division can recognise the information presented by the perceived division, they interact with each other as a whole unity. It is based on these two divisions that objectivity and subjectivity are established. In this talk, we give a mathematical model for characterising the interacting processes between the perceived division and the perceiving division within the framework of ZW-calculus, which is a graphical language representing quantum processes in compact closed categories. We expect that using this model some key interacting processes between the perceived division and the perceiving division can be characterised, which then paves the way for further research on modelling consciousness. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Quanlong Wang - Modelling consciousness divisions in ZW-calculus

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Pierre Baudot Median Technologies, Marseille, France. Elementary quantitative and qualitative aspects of consciousness are investigated conjointly from the biology, neuroscience, physic and mathematic point of view, by the mean of a theory written with Bennequin that derives and extends information theory within algebraic topology. Information structures, that accounts for statistical dependencies within n-body interacting systems are interpreted a la Leibniz within a monadic-panpsychic framework where consciousness is information and physical, and arise from collective interactions. The electrodynamic intrinsic nature of consciousness, sustained by an analogical code, is illustrated by standard neuroscience and psychophysic results. It accounts for the diversity of the learning mechanisms, including adaptive and homeostatic processes on multiple scales, and details their expression within information theory. The axiomatization and logic of cognition are rooted in measure theory expressed within a topos intrinsic probabilistic constructive logic, allowing to express the information of mathematical formula as a Gödel code. Information topology provides a synthesis of the main models of consciousness (integrated information, global neuronal workspace, free energy principle) within a formal Gestalt theory, an expression of information structures and patterns in correspondence with Galois cohomology and symmetries. We give several examples of the application of information topology to standard recognition challenges in AI- machine learning. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Pierre Baudot - Information cohomology and probabilistic topos for consciousness modeling: from elementary perception to machine learning

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Paul Baird Université de Bretagne Atlantique I will present a mathematical model which encapsulates 3D perception from planar 2D data: to a combinatorial graph, we associate its "geometric spectrum"; eigenstates then correspond to local realizations of the graph in Euclidean 3-space as "invariant" frameworks. In this way geometry emerges from the structure, rather than being imposed upon it. One may attempt to construct a model universe based on such structures, in which state realization enacts change; change being synonymous with time, which at an elementary level, we hypothesize, is the realization of temporal states. A coherent time should then emerge from a "survival of the fittest" principle. Conscious entities might then be considered as systems which possess "higher order universality", that is, which process potential information (rather than hard information) such as a "potential" 3D cube, to enact their own change.

Paul Baird - A model for perceptual states

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Mauro D’Ariano Dipartimento di Fisica, Università degli Studi di Pavia I will explore the possibility of drawing definite theoretical assertions about “awareness”, including possible experimental falsification. Awareness will be regarded as a manifestation of a special kind of “information”, and, as such, formalised as an operational probabilistic theory (OPT) [1]. Awareness would correspond to “the feeling of the process” experienced by the OPT-systems involved in the process. As a kind of information “awareness” is special in being “private”. Assuming that such privacy is an in-principle one implies a number of interesting consequences. For example, according to a theorem about information privacy in OPTs [2], investigation will be restricted to OPTs that are essentially non classical, among which the most relevant instance is the quantum theory. After presenting the OPT framework, assessing its methodological robustness in separating objective from theoretical elements, and examining postulates guaranteeing experimental control and falsifiability, I will compare postulates of relevant OPTs, and provide mathematical definitions of notions as holism, causality, complementarity, purification, and information privacy. Finally, I will explore the hypothesis of “awareness as quantum coherence”, providing a list of motivations and consequences, and discussing the possibility of experimental tests in cognitive sciences, including the evaluation of the number of qubits involved in the awareness, the existence of complementary observables, and violations of local-realism bounds. [1] G. M. D’Ariano, G. Chiribella, and P. Perinotti, “Quantum Theory from First Principles: An Informational Approach” (Cambridge University Press 2017) [2] G. M. D’Ariano, P. Perinotti, A. Tosini, “Information and disturbance in operational probabilistic theories”, unpublished Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Mauro D’Ariano - Awareness: an operational theoretical approach

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Anita Mehta Leverhulme Visiting Professor, University of Oxford Short- and long-term memories are distinguished by their forgettability. Most of what we perceive and store is lost rather quickly to noise, as new sensations replace older ones, while some memories last for as long as we live. Synaptic dynamics is key to the process of memory storage; in this talk I will discuss a few approaches we have taken to this problem, culminating in a model of synaptic networks containing both cooperative and competitive dynamics. It turns out that the competition between synapses is key to the natural emergence of long-term memory in this model, as in reality. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Anita Mehta - Chasing memories

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Ramón Guevara Erra Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center (UMR 8002), CNRS and Université Paris Descartes, Paris, France It has been argued that consciousness could be an emergent property of large neuronal networks, associated to the integration of information in the brain. However, it is not yet clear how is consciousness related to the complexity of functional brain networks. Based on a statistical mechanics approach, we sought to identify features of brain organization that are optimal for sensory processing, and that may guide the emergence of consciousness, by analyzing neurophysiological recordings in conscious and unconscious states. We find a surprisingly simple result: Normal wakeful states are characterized by the greatest number of possible configurations of interactions between brain networks, representing highest entropy values. Therefore, the information content is larger in the network associated to conscious states, suggesting that consciousness could be the result of an optimization of information processing. These findings help to guide in a more formal sense inquiry into how consciousness arises from the organization of matter. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Ramón Guevara Erra - Statistical mechanics of consciousness: maximization of information content of neuronal networks is associated with conscious awareness

One in a series of talks from the 2019 Models of Consciousness conference. Michael Silberstein Department of Philosophy, Elizabethtown College; Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland We discuss the implications for the determinateness and intersubjective consistency of conscious experience in two gedanken experiments from quantum mechanics (QM). In particular, we discuss Wigner's friend and the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment with a twist. These are both cases (experiments) where quantum phenomena, or at least allegedly possible quantum phenomena/experiments, and the content/ecacy of conscious experience seem to bear on one another. We discuss why these two cases raise concerns for the determinateness and intersubjective consistency of conscious experience. We outline a 4D-global constraint-based approach to explanation in general and for QM in particular that resolves any such concerns without having to invoke metaphysical quietism (as with pragmatic accounts of QM), objective collapse mechanisms or subjective collapse. In short, we provide an account of QM free from any concerns associated with either the standard formalism or relative-state formalism, an account that yields a single 4D block universe with determinate and intersubjectively consistent conscious experience for all conscious agents. Essentially the mystery in both experiments is caused by a dynamical/causal view of QM, e.g., time-evolved states in Hilbert space, and as we show this mystery can be avoided by a spatiotemporal, constraint-based view of QM, e.g., path integral calculation of probability amplitudes using future boundary conditions. What will become clear is that rather than furiously seeking some way to make dubious deep connections between quantum physics and conscious experience, the kinds of 4D adynamical global constraints that are fundamental to both classical and quantum physics and the relationship between them, also constrain conscious experience. That is, physics properly understood, already is psychology. Filmed at the Models of Consciousness conference, University of Oxford, September 2019.

Michael Silberstein - Quantum mechanics and the consistency of conscious experience

The scientific study of consciousness is a young and thriving field, encompassing empirical and theoretical research of multiple disciplines. This conference aims to bring together researchers whose scientific activity relates to the theoretical and mathematical foundations of this field and to thereby promote the study and creation of models of consciousness and formal approaches to the mind-matter relation. The inaugural conference took place from 9-12 September 2019 in the beautiful Mathematical Institute of the University of Oxford.

hubhopper

Models of Consciousness

hubhopper